In this article, our model consists of two players and two choices for each player. In this model, there is one option for one player in each round called leader. The two players have the same chance to be leader. In this model each two consecutive rounds represent one unit. We consider strategies realized by simple transition rules depending on the previous outcome. We consider homogeneous population of strategy ߗ, and ask for the most favorable adaptation. Any parameter ‫ݏ‬ in ߗ changes according to the adaptive dynamics ‫ݏ‬ሶ ൌ డிሺఆ,ఆ ᇲ ሻ డ௦ where ‫ܨ‬ is the payoff for ߗ-player against ߗ ᇱ ‫ـ‬player and this evaluated at ߗ ᇱ ൌ ߗ.
Introduction
Many examples of reciprocal altruism are modeled by an Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma Game (APDG). In this game we have two players I and II and two choices C to cooperate and D to defect. In each round of the game one of the two
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Essam El-Seidy and Heba K. Arafat players choose his option and the other player reply with his option in another round. For each round there is a single option for one of the two players. This player is called leader (or donor) and the other is called recipient. Consequently the leader control what the outcome is going to be. Each player in this game has the same chance to be leader. That is, the two players in this game alternate the leader role. There are two types of this model, Strictly Alternating (SA) where the two players exchange the leader's role every round and the Randomly Alternating (RA) where the two players exchange the leader's role randomly. In this paper we shall be interested in (RAPDG).
It is argued in Boyd (1988) , Nowak and Sigmund (1994) , and Frean (1994) that mutual aid is often given alternatingly: a good turn to a partner in the hope of an eventual return. A vampire bat feeding a hungry fellow bat is obviously performing a cooperative move; this can be repaid, not simultaneously, but with a time lag. The same holds for a wolf that joins a fight to help its fellow, a bird emitting a warning call, or a monkey scratching another monkey's back. It needs no help right now; it may need it latter. A similar principle operates in economic exchanges within simple social groups, for instance in the bartering of goods and services in households and among neighbors.
The Transition Matrix of RAPDG
For the RAPDG, leader decides between the two choices C and D, option C yields ߙ points to the donor and ߚ points to the recipient, while option D yields ߛ points to the donor and ߜ points to the recipient. In a single round, option D is better than C for the leader. We shall assume that the cost to the donor is less than the benefit that brings to the recipient. The loss is ߛ െ ߙ and the benefit is ߚ-ߜ, then we have 0 ൏ ߛ-ߙ ൏ ߚ-ߜ (1) Now we consider two consecutive rounds in which the players exchange the leader role in turn. If both play C ,both earn ߙ ߚ, which we denote by ܴ, if both play D, both earn ߛ ߜ, which we denote by ܲ, but if one plays C and the other D, then the cooperator earns ߙ ߜ which we denote by ܵ and the defectors earns ߛ ߚ which we denote by ܶ. Thus from (1), we have ܶ ܴ ܲ ܵ (2) and 2ܴ ܶ S (3) The inequalities (2) and (3) are usual conditions for the payoff for the Simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma Game (SPDG), where the two players choose their options at the same time. Adding, we obtain ܶ ܵ ൌ ܲ ܴ (4) Conditions (2), (3) and (4) describes the APD game, while condition (4) means in the SPDG that the cost from switching D to C is the same against a defector as against a cooperator ሺܲ -ܵ ൌ ܶ െ ܴሻ. The four states of outcomes ߙ, ߚ, ߛ and ߜ represents the possible payoff obtained by one of the two players for one round. If we denote these outcomes by 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively, then the possible strategies for each player can be represented by the quadruple ሺ‫ݑ‬ ଵ , ‫ݑ‬ ଶ , ‫ݑ‬ ଷ , ‫ݑ‬ ସ ሻ, where ‫ݑ‬ denotes the probability to play C after outcome ݅. These probabilities are independent of the random decision of who is going to be leader. If a player with strategy ܲ ൌ ሺ‫‬ ଵ , ‫‬ ଶ , ‫‬ ଷ , ‫‬ ସ ሻ and probability y to play C in the first round match against a player with strategy ܳ ൌ ሺ‫ݍ‬ ଵ , ‫ݍ‬ ଶ , ‫ݍ‬ ଷ , ‫ݍ‬ ସ ሻ and probability ‫′ݕ‬ to play C in the first round, then the transition matrix for the match from one round to the next is given by
For instance the transition probability from state 1 to state 2 for the ܲ-player equals the product of the probability that the ܳ-player is leader, which equals ଵ ଶ and the probability ‫ݍ‬ ଶ that the ܳ-player cooperates after receiving ߚ in the previous round.
The Payoff of a Player in RAPD Game
If ߩ denote the probability that the game proceed in the next round, then we have two cases to study, when ߩ ൌ 1 (limiting case) and ߩ ൏ 1. 
1-For
From equations (i) to (iii) (or (ii) and (iv)) we deduce that
(vi) Equations (v) and (vi) leads to
Also for equations (i), (iii) and (v) we get
Let ߨ ଵ ൌ ߨ and ߨ ଶ ൌ ߨ ᇱ , then (7) and (8) leads to
Substituting with П in (6), yield the following equations
This set of equations can be reduced to the following two equations
Solving equations (vii) and (viii) leads to
and
Now if ‫ܨ‬ is the payoff for the ܲ-player, then ‫ܨ‬ is given by
Using (9) and (10) in ‫,ܨ‬ we get
Where ߭ ൌ ‫‬ ଷ െ ‫‬ ଵ , ߤ ൌ ‫‬ ସ െ ‫‬ ଶ and ߬ ൌ ‫‬ ଷ ‫‬ ସ for P-player and similarly ߭ ᇱ , ߤ ᇱ , and ߬ ᇱ for ܳ-player. In this case we note that the initial probability ‫ݕ‬ and ‫′ݕ‬ play no role.
2-For ൏ 1
The total payoff ‫ܨ‬ for the ܲ-player against ܳ-player in this case is given by
Where ‫,ܣ‬ ‫,ܤ‬ ߁ and ߂ are the expected payoffs for the ܲ-player, given that the first round of the game resulted in ߙ, ߚ, ߛ and ߜ respectively. Then we have
Dynamics of randomly alternating prisoner's dilemma game
is the probability that P-player will be leader. We can rewrite equations (13) as following
Where ‫ܫ‬ is the 4-unit matrix has full rank, hence equations (13') in matrix form takes the form ‫ܭܪ‬ ൌ ܺ
where
, then the two players have a very small chance to play with each other again, put ߩ ⟶ 0 in (13') we get ‫ܪ‬ ⟶ ‫,ܫ‬ ‫ܭ‬ ⟶ ܺ, which means that the expected payoffs for the two players equal to the ones obtained in the first round of the game. If ߩ ⟶ 1, there is a high probability that the game will proceed in the next round. Equations in (13') can be written respectively as follows
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Solving equations from (15) to (17) in ሺ‫ܣ‬ െ ߁ሻ, ሺ‫ܤ‬ െ ߂ሻ and (߁ ߂ሻ, we get
Equations (19), (20) and (21) give the payoff ‫ܨ‬ (see (12) ) for the P-player.
The Adaptive Dynamics For The APDG
We consider a homogeneous population of ߗ-players, and ask for the most favorable adaptation. If an individual was permitted a small deviation from strategy ߗ, which direction would be most favorable. If ‫ݏ‬ is any parameter belonging to ߗ where ‫ݏ‬ can be ‫,ݕ‬ ‫‬ ଵ , ‫‬ ଶ , … . ‫ݎ‬ ‫‬ ସ , then ‫ݏ‬ changes according to the adaptive dynamics, by
Where the right hand side of (22) evaluated at ߗ ൌ ߗ ᇱ . The differentiation of ‫ܨ‬ yields very cumbersome computation, so we shall use the implicit function theorem. Equations (14) can be written as ݂ ൫‫‬ ଵ , ‫‬ ଶ, ‫‬ ଷ , ‫‬ ସ , ‫ݍ‬ ଵ, ‫ݍ‬ ଶ , ‫ݍ‬ ଷ , ‫ݍ‬ ସ , ‫,ܣ‬ ‫,ܤ‬ ߁, ߂, ߙ, ߚ, ߛ, ߜ൯ ൌ 0 , ݅ ൌ 1,2,3,4 where
Hence, by the implicit function theorem, we have 
Now from (12) and (22), we get the following
where, ‫‬ ଵ ሶ ൌ ‫‬ ଶ ሶ and ‫‬ ଷ ሶ ൌ ‫‬ ସ ሶ . We note that the sign of ‫‬ ଵ ሶ and ‫‬ ଷ ሶ is the same as the sign of ሺ‫ܣ‬ െ ߁ሻ which has been computed in (19).Using the previous expressions together with the equations (26) ‫ــ‬ (29), we get the following result.
Theorem .The adaptive dynamics for the RAPD game is given by
and For every case we note that ሺ1ሻ ‫‬ ଵ ሶ ൌ ‫‬ ଶ ሶ and ‫‬ ଷ ሶ ൌ ‫‬ ସ ሶ and this means that the optimal adaptation depends only on whether there was a C or a D in the previous round, and not on who actually implemented it. ሺ2ሻ ‫ݕ‬ሶ and all ‫‬ ଵ ሶ has positive sign and this gives the zone of cooperation, which is defined by ሺߙ െ ߛሻሺ2 ߩ߭ሻ ሺߚ െ ߜሻߩߤ ሺ40ሻ and it is independent of ‫.ݕ‬ In the limiting case ሺߩ ൌ 1ሻ, we see that condition ߟ ଶିఘ ఘ is always satisfied.
Cooperation is easier to achieve the larger of the zone, i.e. the temptation ܶ െ ܴ to defect unilaterally is smaller compared with the gain ܴ െ ܲ obtained by mutual cooperation.
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In particular, if ߟ ଶ ఘ ,then from (41) the zone of cooperation contains the strategy given by ሺ‫‬ ଵ , ‫‬ ଶ , ‫‬ ଷ , ‫‬ ସ ሻ ൌ ሺ1,1,1,0ሻ, which is always ready to cooperate except if it has been played for a sucker, i.e. if it has experienced a ߜ in the last round. In this case, it defects if it is leader in the next round, but it defects only once. We note that in the limiting case ሺߩ ൌ 1ሻ, condition ߟ ଶ ఘ simply means that the coast to the donor ߛ െ ߙ is twice as large as the benefit to the recipient ߚ െ ߜ.
It is easy to find the consensus strategy with highest payoff which immune to defection. If all members of the population adopt this strategy, then the exploiters with a lower propensity to cooperate cannot invade, and the overall payoff for the population is maximal (subject to this non-invadability condition). This payoff is given by
Then from (19), (20) and (21) 
The total payoff for the population in which all its members adopt the strategy with highest payoff which immune to defection is given by
(which we call AllC strategy) The adaptive dynamics for the RAPD game is given by
The overall payoff for the population in which all its members adopt the strategy with highest payoff which immune to defection is given by 
